People with higher interoceptive sensitivity are more altruistic, but improving interoception does not increase altruism by Piech, Richard M. et al.
1SCientifiC REPORtS | 7: 15652  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-017-14318-8
www.nature.com/scientificreports
People with higher interoceptive 
sensitivity are more altruistic, but 
improving interoception does not 
increase altruism
Richard M. Piech1,2, Daniela Strelchuk1, Jake Knights1, Jonathan V. Hjälmheden2,  
Jonas K. Olofsson2 & Jane E. Aspell1
People consistently show preferences and behaviors that benefit others at a cost to themselves, a 
phenomenon termed altruism. We investigated if perception of one’s body signals – interoception - may 
be underlying such behaviors. We tested if participants’ sensitivity to their own heartbeat predicted 
their decision on a choice between self-interest and altruism, and if improving this sensitivity through 
training would make participants more altruistic. Across these two experiments, interoceptive 
sensitivity predicted altruism measured through monetary generosity. Improving interoceptive 
sensitivity did, however, not lead to more altruistic behaviour. We conclude that there is a unique 
link between interoception and altruistic behaviour, likely established over an individual’s history of 
altruistic acts, and the body responses they elicit. The findings suggest that humans might literally 
‘listen to their heart’ to guide their altruistic behavior.
Despite clear biological and economic advantages of acting in self-interest, people consistently show a range of 
preferences and behaviors that benefit others at a cost to themselves1. We investigated potential physiological 
mechanisms underlying this phenomenon, known as altruism.
A prominent view of the nature of emotions assigns a critical role to bodily responses2,3. The view emphasizes 
the notion that the bodily response to a situation comes before the feeling - and that the feeling of emotion is the 
perception of such a response. There is growing evidence that internal bodily states influence emotional experience4  
and greater sensitivity to internal states is associated with feeling emotions more intensely5. Moreover, bodily 
responses to emotionally-loaded situations bias decisions, and the lack of detectable bodily signals impairs deci-
sion making6,7. Conversely, improving the monitoring of bodily signals is often emphasized in meditation and 
emotional intelligence training, practices aimed at improving prosocial interactions8.
Interoceptive sensitivity – the accurate detection of internal bodily states – varies markedly between individ-
uals - and continues to be linked to an ever-growing list of affective and cognitive behaviors9, including intuitive 
decision making10. The role of interoception in prosocial decision making has recently been examined using the 
‘ultimatum game’ in which a proposer decides how to share a given sum of money and the responder chooses 
whether or not to accept it11. Presentation of own heartbeat sounds during the game affected feelings of unfairness 
and the number of unfair offers by proposers12, while delivery of painful (interoceptive) stimuli during the game 
caused people to make fewer fair offers13. By contrast, in meditators, a different network of interoceptive brain 
areas were recruited than in controls during the game, and the meditators made more rational decisions14. Given 
such links between interoceptive sensitivity, experienced emotions and decision making, it is conceivable that 
interoceptive sensitivity may mediate the extent to which bodily cues affect prosocial decision making.
Methods
In the present study, we probed the possible association between the sensing of one’s own body signals and the 
decision to act altruistically: we investigated if deciding on a choice between self-interest and altruism is related 
to how well people sense their own physiological body processes (interoceptive sensitivity). To probe altruistic 
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behavior, we used a modified dictator game15, in which the player divides real money between herself and another, 
unknown person, as they please. The game measures pure altruism, and corresponds to real-life charitable giving16. 
As a second index of altruistic behavior, we probed participants’ willingness to help the experimenter with a tedi-
ous questionnaire following the completion of the dictator game task and after they had been renumerated for 
their time. Additionally, we measured how well participants performed on a heartbeat detection task, to obtain a 
measure of interoceptive sensitivity (experiment 1), and provided training to improve their interoceptive sensi-
tivity (experiment 2). Participants provided self-report measures of materialism, a trait reflecting the importance 
of personal goals relating to financial success, attractive appearance and social recognition17, as such goals may 
often clash with altruistic behaviors. We also collected self-reported empathy18, the ability or tendency to ‘feel 
what it is like’ to be someone else: to infer another’s emotion, and/or to share, or vicariously feel, the emotion of 
an other19,20 - as some studies have shown it correlates with prosocial behavior21,22.
In an interoceptive sensitivity experiment (experiment 1), 30 participants completed a sequential dictator game 
after providing informed consent. In the game (Fig. 1D), participants choose one of two amounts of money, to 
give to oneself or to another, anonymous player. A choice may be: ‘Myself: £0.52 or Other: £1.04’. The amounts 
vary between £0.10 and £3.00, and the ratios between 3:1 and 1:3. There are 60 such choices. Participants, and the 
anonymous other player, receive the money allocated on two randomly selected trials at the end of experiment. 
Altruistic behavior was measured as monetary generosity, the sum of money allocated to the other player on all 
trials. Participants then completed a heartbeat detection task (ref.23, see also supplementary materials), in which 
they listened to a series of beeps synchronous with their heartbeat or to beeps at a control frequency (at an accel-
erated or decelerated speed). They had to indicate if the beeps they heard were in time with their own heartbeats 
or not, over 16 trials (half were synchronous and half asynchronous). Interoceptive sensitivity was scored as the 
proportion of correct answers. Participants then filled in a measure of materialism17, and of empathy18, before 
they were paid for participation, and in accordance with their dictator game decisions, and told that they were 
free to leave. Then, the experimenter said the participant could help him/her by completing a collection of math-
ematical tasks. Time spent on the tasks was used as a measure of helping behavior.
Figure 1. Participants’ monetary generosity increases with interoceptive sensitivity. Sum of money given to 
another person in dictator game, in pounds (GBP), and interoceptive sensitivity. (A) Interoceptive sensitivity 
experiment (experiment 1); (B) interoceptive training experiment (experiment 2). Lines illustrate linear regression 
functions. Crossed out dot: one participant (perfectly generous, over 3 standard deviations above the mean), 
excluded from the analysis. (A) An improvement in interoception by 10% (a shift of 0.1 to right) corresponds 
to giving £5 more to another person. (C) Improved interoceptive sensitivity does not lead to more giving. Left 
panel: interoception training improved interoceptive sensitivity: mean scores before and after training (t28 = 3.22, 
p = 0.003). Right panel: interoception training does not change monetary generosity: mean scores before and 
after training (t28 = 0.21, p = 0.838). (D) Illustration of a single trial in the adapted dictator game. Participants 
choose an amount for themselves or an amount for another person. Amounts and ratios vary (£0.10 to £3.00, 
ratios 3:1 − 1:3). Two randomly chosen trials are paid out at end (maximal gain £6, minimal gain 0).
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An interoceptive training experiment (experiment 2, N = 57) followed the same procedure, except that one 
group of participants received interoceptive training: after the initial heartbeat detection task, they completed it a 
second time, this time with feedback (they were told if their answer was correct or not). A third heartbeat detec-
tion task was then completed (without feedback) to evaluate the training effect. The control group was trained on 
a task assessing the detection of audio-visual synchrony as a control procedure (see supplementary materials), 
and did not perform a second heartbeat detection task.
The studies were approved by the Institutional Research Ethics Review Boards of Anglia Ruskin University 
and Stockholm University, and carried out in accordance with their guidelines and the Declaration of Helsinki. 
All participants gave written informed consent prior to participation.
Results
Interoceptive sensitivity experiment (experiment 1, Fig. 1A). As hypothesized, participants’ monetary generosity 
correlated with interoceptive sensitivity (r28 = 0.44, p = 0.019, 95% Confidence Interval [0.08, 0.70]), and with 
low materialism (r28 = 0.40, p = 0.036, 95% CI [0.03, 0.67]), but not with empathy level (r28 = 0.18, p = 0.356, 95% 
CI [−0.21, 0.52]. The time participants spent helping did not correlate with interoceptive sensitivity, low mate-
rialism, or empathy, indicating that this measure of altruism is not linked to those factors (see supplementary 
materials).
Because we aimed to influence interoceptive sensitivity experimentally, we also calculated a linear regression 
with only interoceptive sensitivity as predictor. The regression suggested that a 10% improvement in interoceptive 
sensitivity would be associated with a £5 increased giving (a 16% increase on the mean of £32.11) to the anony-
mous other person (Fig. 1A). We aimed to achieve such an improvement in experiment 2.
Interoceptive training experiment (experiment 2, Fig. 1B,C). Substantiating the finding from experiment 1, 
in experiment 2 we also observed that participants’ monetary generosity correlated with interoceptive sensitiv-
ity (r56 = 0.32, p = 0.018, 95% CI [0.06, 0.54]), but, unlike in experiment 1, the significant association was not 
observed for monetary generosity and low materialism (r56 = 0.12, p = 0.390, 95% CI [−0.15, 0.37]). As in exper-
iment 1, there was no significant association between monetary generosity and empathy (r56 = 0.11, p = 0.427, 
95% CI [−0.16, 0.36]).
Participants in the interoceptive training experiment (experiment 2) improved their interoceptive sensitivity 
performance by 10% (t(28) = 3.22, p = 0.003; Fig. 1C), but that improvement did not make them more generous 
after the training (t(28) = 0.21, p = 0.838; Fig. 1C, see supplementary materials). Unlike in experiment 1, the sec-
ond measure of altruism, helping time, correlated significantly with interoceptive sensitivity (rSpearman(57) = 0.27, 
p = 0.044), but not with low materialism, or empathy (see supplementary materials).
Discussion
Across two experiments, interoceptive sensitivity predicted monetary generosity. These results provide evidence 
for a link between interoception and altruistic behaviour. The link with altruistic behaviour is specific to intero-
ceptive sensitivity, as other measures we obtained did not predict monetary generosity. We can also discount the 
possibility that the critical property linking altruism and interoception is a general sensory sensitivity to body or 
environmental signals. In a third experiment (smell sensitivity experiment), we tested participants’ performance 
detecting faint smells, a perceptual signal that is intimately linked to the perception of internal and homeostatic 
states in the generation of food-related behaviors24. If altruism were higher in individuals with better overall 
sensitivity to faint sensory impressions, olfactory detection sensitivity is a plausible candidate to display a pattern 
of association similar to that observed for interoception. We asked whether smell detection sensitivity would be 
similarly associated with altruistic behavior in the dictator game. The correlation of smell sensitivity to altruism 
was much weaker than those obtained in experiments 1 and 2 for interoceptive sensitivity, and statistically not 
significant [r21 = 0.16, p = 0.488, 95% CI [−0.26, 0.54]]. This indicates that altruistic behavior in experiments 1 
and 2 is likely to be specifically linked to their interoceptive sensitivity, rather than sensitivity to any faint sensory 
signal capable of interacting with internal states.
Low materialism shows a trend to predict both forms of altruistic behavior, monetary generosity and helping 
(see supplementary materials), but not consistently across the experiments. Empathy showed no association with 
altruistic behaviour, in contrast to some previous studies (e.g.21,22), and this may be due to our particular empa-
thy measure: the empathy quotient questionnaire18 which measures both affective and cognitive empathy. Had 
we measured cognitive and affective empathy separately, e.g. with the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective 
Empathy19 and the Multifaceted Empathy Test20, a relation might have been found.
The interoceptive sensitivity experiment points to an association between interoceptive sensitivity and altruistic 
behavior but cannot demonstrate causality. The interoception training experiment tested one possible form of 
causation. Its result shows that enhancing the ability to detect one’s heartbeat, through short training, does not 
enhance altruistic behavior in a subsequent game.
If there indeed was a causal relationship between sensitivity to heartbeats and altruistic behavior (which our 
interoception training experiment fails to demonstrate), what could be its nature? The relationship might be based 
on short-term signals, reflecting moment-to-moment changes in the body. Such a relationship would be consist-
ent with a value-based model of decision making25, whereby peripheral signals provide value-weights to guide 
decisions, or with the somatic marker hypothesis of behavior guidance6. A person might encounter an emotion-
ally evocative situation (like a choice to give away money, or not), that causes a heartbeat signal change (e.g. a 
strengthening of the signal). That bodily signal is interoceptively detected, and biases the choice towards the 
altruistic option (the direction remains unexplained, but could relate to avoiding the social stress of not sharing26). 
Peripheral physiological events have been shown to influence complex cognitive processes on a short time scale 
(e.g. heartbeat to heartbeat27; giving such a scenario some plausibility. But the results of our interoceptive training 
experiment show that enhancing the body signal detection through training does not bias choice - it does not 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
4SCientifiC REPORtS | 7: 15652  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-017-14318-8
make people more altruistic in a subsequent game. This result appears inconsistent with a moment-to-moment 
account that assumes a direct causal link from interoception to altruism (see supplementary materials). What 
would explain such a result? One possibility is that our procedure is not sufficiently sensitive to the effect.
A possible alternative account focuses on the perception of distress in others. (It supposes that in the course of 
the dictator game, participants form a representation of distress in the recipient with whom one does not share.) 
Altruistic people stand out in their ability to detect distress in faces28. Moreover, extreme altruists (non-directed 
organ donors) have larger amygdalae (nuclei activated by emotional material), which also respond more strongly 
to faces communicating distress than amygdalae of control participants29. Given that different levels of interocep-
tive sensitivity are linked to differences in emotional experience in general10, and that body responses specifically 
contribute to the perception of distress30, heightened interoceptive sensitivity may enhance perception of distress 
and support altruism, explaining the results of our experiments. At this stage, the idea is a speculation which may 
be confirmed in studies including measurement of stress and distress, which our studies do not. Additionally, the 
functional significance of the amygdala for fear and anxiety may connect that structure to the complex of inter-
oception and altruism. This remains to be explored in future studies. Future studies may also focus on the role 
emotions and their components (e.g. activation) experienced during the task play in altruistic behaviour.
It is worth noting that although we have assumed that our heartbeat discrimination task reflects interoceptive 
sensitivity specifically, it is in fact measuring the brain’s ability to integrate or compare exteroceptive (auditory) 
and interoceptive (cardiac) stimuli to make synchronicity judgments, and thus performance on this task is likely 
to be dependent on a somewhat different network of brain areas than the ‘cleaner’ heartbeat tracking task31, which 
requires participants to internally count heartbeats. We chose the heartbeat discrimination task, however because 
it is not affected to the same degree by confounds such as time estimation ability and beliefs about one’s own heart 
rate32. Both tasks are problematic, also because they often fail to correlate with each other, and with interoceptive 
awareness33, particularly in relatively small samples of poorly performing participants. Although differences in 
performance on our heartbeat discrimination task could be due to variations in attention34, our failure to find 
a significant association between prosocial behavior and smell sensitivity (see supplementary material), which 
should also be affected by attention, contradicts this argument.
Our results suggest that altruistic acts may be influenced by the representation of one’s body in the brain. 
Although the mechanisms underpinning this relationship need to be clarified, the present findings indicate that 
humans in some sense ‘listen to their heart’ to shape their altruistic behaviors.
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